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ABSTRACT 
Several studies have been conducted to address growing concern over the cost of the 
current military retirement system. Recently, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
conducted a comprehensive study of Alternative Navy Retirement Systems.   
The CNA study modeled the value of the current military retirement system and 
alternative retirement systems to service members utilizing a net present value (NPV) 
measurement. The proposed alternatives attempt to offer cost savings to the Department 
of the Navy (DoN) while maintaining an equivalent NPV to the service member in order 
to mitigate retention and force structure risk associated with a change in retirement 
systems.   
A significant factor in calculating NPV is the discount rate that service members 
apply towards various types of compensation. Current models have utilized static 
discount rates which do not account for the observed changes in discount rates 
individuals apply towards items based on when they expect to receive those items and 
other biasing factors.    
This thesis develops a method to measure military service members discounting 
behaviors across different spans of time. This thesis evaluates the impact that time 
inconsistent discount rates might have on the NPV of retirement alternatives calculated in 
the draft CNA report on Navy retirement reform. 
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Recent U.S. federal deficit spending and a growing U.S. national debt have 
become increasingly popular topics for political debate, leading to calls for reforms and 
reductions in federal government spending. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates put federal deficit spending at $1.2 trillion for 2012, with total federal debt 
increasing to 73 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (CBO, 2012b). This is its 
highest level since the 1950s and nearly twice the debt to GDP ratio in 2007 (CBO, 
2012b). As a major recipient of federal funds, the Department of Defense (DoD) believes 
that it may soon be forced to reduce its budgets to comply with federal spending 
reductions, should they occur (Grefer, Phillips, & Shufford, 2012). Additionally, DoD 
believes that current personnel costs are both too high and growing at unsustainable rates 
(Grefer et al., 2012). As political and policy dialogue on federal spending continue, what 
is certain is that military retirement will continue to be analyzed and debated because 
congressional law requires the President to provide a comprehensive evaluation and 
recommendations on military retirement every four years (U.S.C., Title 37, Section 
1008b). 
As a means to reduce federal spending tied to the military, DoD is investigating 
reforms to the current military retirement system. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
(VCNO), in response to Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) interest in retirement 
reform, tasked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to conduct a study of military 
retirement reform proposals developed by OSD. Specifically, the Department of the Navy 
(DON) expressed interest in how proposed changes to military retirement would impact 
Navy costs and personnel (Grefer et al., 2012). It should be noted that the CNA report is 
categorized as a preliminary report and is thus subject to further review and analysis prior 
to release and/or DON endorsement (Grefer et al., 2012). This report is referred to as the 
“CNA study” or “CNA report” throughout this document.     
 2
In conjunction with the CNA study, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was 
also called upon to conduct research and analysis on military retirement reform for DON 
at the request of the VCNO. This thesis and its accompanying research were designed to 
provide additional analysis and insight into potential reforms to the current military 
retirement system. Specifically, this thesis reviews methodologies and results of past 
scientific studies that measure individual discount rates (IDR) with the objective of 
designing an IDR experiment and surveying methodology that can be deployed within 
DoD to better measure service member IDRs and thus better estimate service members’ 
responses to changes in retirement and other compensation.   
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this research is to determine what type of IDR methodology will 
most accurately predict the discounting behavior of military personnel when faced with 
significant changes to retirement or other compensation. We are hopeful that this research 
can help policymakers build more accurate models, which may be utilized to predict 
military members’ responses to potential alternations of the military retirement system. 
By reviewing prior research on individual discount rates, we are able to develop an 
optimized approach to eliciting discount rates in military personnel.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The perceived value of military pay and compensation, including the military 
retirement benefit, has substantial influence on who joins the military and how long they 
remain. Because of this relationship, changes to military compensation must be carefully 
implemented to safeguard national defense capabilities from unexpected and unintended 
shifts in retention and/or recruiting. This thesis addresses two primary research questions. 
First, what is an optimal methodology to measure IDRs in service members?  Because 
discount rates significantly impact net present value (NPV) calculations which are 




utilize accurate IDRs that produce realistic NPVs. Secondly, a priori, how do 
demographic factors correlate to IDRs, and what potential implications do they present 
for DoD?      
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis analyzes the findings of past research to develop an optimal method 
for eliciting personal discount rates in military personnel. The experiment is designed to 
utilize a population sample of active-duty military personnel, consisting of both enlisted 
personnel and officers, across the spectrum of experience and time in service. We believe 
that experience and time in service could have significant impacts on IDRs, thus it is 
important for the experiment to encompass a diverse field of military personnel. 
Experimental design limits the population to active-duty military personnel, due to the 
significant differences in retirement compensation between active and reserve military 
personnel. This research is primarily limited to finding the aggregate perspective of 
military personnel based on the likelihood that any changes to military retirement would 
affect the aggregate; however, the experimental design we adopt does allow for analysis 
at the individual level (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012). The research design we have 
chosen, based primarily on the recent work of Andreoni and Sprenger, addresses both 
convex and discrete budget sets. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) limit their design to short 
run intertemporal choice whereas we plan to expand the experimental design to include 
long-run decisions.       
We have developed a two-by-two experimental design utilizing both convex and 
discrete approaches to measuring discount rates, across both relatively short and long 
periods of time. The convex methodology is based on the convex time budget (CTB) 
approach developed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). With CTB, individuals are 
provided a budget of tokens, which they may allocate to a near-term or a more distant 
time period. Tokens redeemed at the near term typically have a lower value than if they 
were redeemed at the later period. The discrete methodology utilizes a multiple price list 
(MPL) approach, which is employed in numerous prior studies (Harrison, Lau, & 
Williams, 2002; Thaler, 1981). With MPL, individuals are asked to choose between 
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receiving a benefit x at a near time period or a benefit of x + (some additional amount) at 
a later time period. These questions are asked multiple times in a list format, with 
alterations to the additional value or the time period between benefits. Both methods 
utilize monetary payments and are deployed in a laboratory environment. Experimental 
design is explained in detail in Chapter IV.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the history of military 
retirement and current interest in military retirement reform. Chapter III provides a 
literature review of time preference research, with a focus on MPL and CTB oriented 
studies. Chapter IV describes an optimal experimental design for eliciting discount rates 
in military personnel, based on the findings of our research. Chapter V provides a brief 
review of the discount rate methodology used in the recent CNA analysis of military 
retirement. Chapter VI provides findings of the research and recommendations.  
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II. HISTORY OF MILITARY RETIREMENT AND REVIEW OF 
PROPOSED MILITARY RETIREMENT REFORM  
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY RETIREMENT  
Calls for reform to the military retirement system are not new. The military 
retirement system has been polarizing since its inception in the late 1940s, drawing sharp 
criticism as well as strong support. In general, the system has received strong support 
from military members, Congress, and defense manpower analysts, while the general 
public has regularly found issue with the potentially young age of retirees and the cost 
associated with the benefits those retirees receive (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). Despite 
numerous calls for a complete overhaul of the retirement system, only moderate 
adjustments to the formula used to calculate retirement pay have occurred, leaving 
military retirement largely unchanged since its modern inception in 1947 (Henning, 
2008). At present, the two most salient features of military retirement remain unchanged: 
a defined benefit lifetime annuity and a requirement for 20 years of service (YOS) to vest 
and receive said annuity.    
The 20 YOS vesting cliff for officers was first implemented in 1946 for the Navy 
and Marine Corps, and in 1948 for the Army and the then newly established Air Force 
(Christian, 2006). Prior to this adjustment, Navy and Marine Corps officers had a 30 
YOS vesting while the Army had a 15 YOS vesting cliff. Enlisted personnel of all 
services were not eligible for voluntary retirement until 1945, when legislation provided 
them with a 20 YOS vesting cliff and benefits in alignment with the officer community. 
Christian (2006) cites military member welfare and private-sector competitiveness as 
major reasons for eventually including enlisted personnel.     
Another major feature of the military retirement system is the method by which 
retirement pay is calculated. Features of the current system can be traced back to Navy 
officer retirement pay legislation first implemented in 1855, in which separated officers 
were provided 75 percent of sea duty pay (Christian, 2006). The most direct lineage can 
be seen in the military “up or out” promotion system of 1915, which created retirement 
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pay of 2.5 percent times YOS, up to a maximum of 75 percent of pay (Christian, 2006). 
The 1915 framework remains basically unchanged today.   
The major adjustment between the “up or out’ system of 1915 and the present 
system is the calculation of final pay. As a result of past adjustments to the way in which 
final pay is calculated, the military retirement system currently utilizes three different 
retirement pay formulas to determine benefits for retired active duty personnel, and two 
formulas to calculate benefits for retired reservists (Henning, 2008). Qualification for the 
different formulas is based on the date of entry for service members. The most recent pay 
formula system is referred to as the “High-Three System,” based on a retirement benefits 
pay calculation that takes the average of the highest three years of basic pay a service 
member has earned. An alteration of this system is referred to as “REDUX,” which 
provides a $30,000 bonus during service years in exchange for reduced retirement 
benefits. The prior systems, which still retains a limited number of beneficiaries, is 
referred to as the Final Basic Pay System, due to its retirement benefits pay calculation 
that utilizes the final basic pay a service member received. As retirement programs have 
been adjusted and scaled back, members who joined prior to the adjustments have 
historically been grandfathered into the pay formula in place when they entered the 
military. Current reform efforts have focused on changes to both active and reserve duty 
retirement pay (Henning, 2008); however, this study focuses on the active duty retirement 
system and on potential changes to the most recent retirement compensation formula.   
B. RENEWED INTEREST IN RETIREMENT REFORM  
A growing national debt and increased deficit spending by the federal government 
within the context of a struggling U.S. economy have increased scrutiny of the military 
retirement system (Grefer et al., 2012). In 2011, $699 billion of the $1.3 trillion in 
discretionary federal spending was allocated to military programs (CBO, 2011a). U.S. 
military spending ranks first globally at 41 percent of total military spending, with China 
number two at roughly eight percent followed by Russia at four percent (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2012). Critics of military retirement cite 
retirement program cost growth, retirement trust fund unfunded liability growth, and 
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retirement benefits that are considered more generous than the private sector (Henning, 
2008). DoD’s Office of the Actuary projects military retirement costs of $51.7 billion in 
2012 with projections that those costs will rise to $59.0 billion by 2022 (DoD, 2010). 
Christian (2006, p. ix) provides greater granularity, listing these five major driving forces 
behind recent efforts to reform military retirement compensation:     
 Cost: Reducing the benefits associated with the transition from active duty 
to civilian life during the so-called “second-career phase” of military 
retirement. (The term “second- career phase” refers to the fact that service 
members who are fully vested receive an immediate annuity upon 
retirement, which is often at a young enough age for them to embark on a 
second career until they reach old-age retirement.) 
 Equity: Providing benefits for members separating before 20 years of 
service (YOS) as well as for those who are vested at 20 YOS. 
 Selective retention: Increasing incentives for key service members to stay 
beyond 20 YOS. 
 Civilian comparability: Providing a defined contribution plan that vests 
earlier than 20 YOS. (The military retirement system is a defined benefit 
plan, commonly called a pension plan in the private sector. The Thrift 
Savings Plan is a type of defined contribution plan.) 
 Force management flexibility: Providing tools for the services to create 
variable careers for the services to create variable career lengths when 
needed for force management. (Christian, 2006, p. ix) 
Asch, Johnson, and Warner (1998) provide numerous criticisms of the current 
retirement system that are also noted in the later works of Grefer et al., (2012), Henning 
(2008), and Christian (2006). Asch et al., (1998) note a lack of equity, referencing the 
fact that outside of disability, there are no retirement benefits for military members who 
fail to complete 20 YOS. Additionally, they note that the current system is poorly 
structured for flexible force management and carries excessively high costs compared to 
benefits found in the private sector. In contrast, military manpower planners often praise 
the current military retirement system due to the retention stability it creates and the 
importance of this stability in providing a high quality volunteer force capable of meeting 
the Americas’ war fighting requirements (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007).   
The all-or-nothing 20 YOS vesting cliff is commonly seen as unfair, especially in 
the context of a decade long war in which most of America’s warfighters will not receive 
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a retirement benefit. However, Myung (unpublished survey, 2012) surveying 350 service 
members comprised primarily of commissioned officers from NPS and Second Marine 
Expeditionary Force (II MEF) found that 69.8 percent of respondents felt the current 
military retirement system is fair, when provided figures showing that only 17 percent of 
active duty military members will serve long enough to receive retirement. Hudson and 
Buchalter (2007) find that approximately 30 to 40 percent of military officers will 
complete 20 YOS and reach retirement benefits eligibility and only 10 to 15 percent of 
enlisted personnel will reach 20 YOS. The generally low percentages and significant 
disparity between officers and enlisted personnel highlight the equity issue.  
Despite these criticisms, it remains extremely difficult and divisive for 
policymakers to determine what constitutes an appropriate compensation for America’s 
retired military. Most criticisms focus on the issue of civilian comparability. This 
approach might achieve greater validity if comparisons to military compensation were 
limited to private-sector jobs that entail similar unpaid overtime requirements and 
occupational hazards. Law enforcement and firefighting would likely present similar 
occupational hazards; however, those professions are largely unionized so adjustments 
for overtime compensation would need to be taken into consideration. Henning (2008) 
notes that some consider the military retirement system to be fair given the hardships 
endured by service members who have deployed numerous times to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
Ultimately, policymakers are left to make tough choices that balance the cost of 
the military retirement system with the future defense needs of the country and provide 
equity for members of the military. Significant changes to military retirement could have 
negative impacts on recruiting and retention and would likely entail changes to force 
structure and military readiness Christian (2006). Although difficult to achieve, it is 
possible that policymakers will be able to create an alternative retirement system that 
creates equal or greater welfare, at a lower cost to the government, by changing the 
timeline in which benefits are received. To the contrary, continued inaction would 
dangerously ignore known issues with a program displaying excessive cost growth.        
9III. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS TIME PREFERENCE
RESEARCH  
A. INDIVIDUAL DISCOUNTING RATES AND THE DISCOUNTED 
UTILITY MODEL  
Personal discount rates-how individuals value current versus future benefits-are 
an important tool for economists and public policymakers. However, because of their 
very subjective nature, the task of measuring and correctly applying discount rates in 
economic models has long been scrutinized and remains contentious. The difficulty 
reflects the fact that personal discount rates require blending mathematical theory and 
human behavior. As a sign of this confluence, research on time preferences is commonly 
carried out in both the field of economics as well as psychology (Frederick, Shane, 
Loewenstein, &O’Donoghue, 2002). While one individual may prefer a steady stream of 
income because of the consumption smoothing stability it provides, another individual 
who places less value on stability may prefer large chunks of income coupled with 
periods of instability, demonstrating a more prominent preference towards present bias. 
The difficulty for policymakers is to determine where the middle ground lies, thus 
providing all parties with an adequate level of benefit, while reducing the hardship 
incurred by individuals who are receiving benefits at other than the individual optimum 
levels.   
The foundation of personal discount rate theory can be largely attributed to the 
work of American Economists and Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson in his 1938 
discounted utility (DU) framework (Goldin, 2007). Samuelson encapsulated the idea of 
intertemporal choice into a mathematical equation where all variance in choice could be 
explained by a single variable, the discount rate. Samuelson argued that costs and 
benefits occurring at various times can be easily compared by applying a discount rate 
(Ainslie, 2007), and thus normalizing the measurements. Mathematically, Samuelson’s 
theory is represented as follows: 




U(x0, x1,x2,…) represents the total utility of all options of x.  u(x) represents the 
instantaneous utility of each individual x at any time t.    represents the discount factor 
where   = (1/1+d) and d is the discount rate. Lastly, x represents the outcome of option 
at some time t. Most notable from the equation is the idea that with any positive 
discount rate, a numerical value of benefits received today will be worth more than 
receiving that same numerical value in the future.     
Since its introduction, Samuelson’s DU model has seen widespread adoption and 
has served in a foundational position for many economists and social scientists (Goldin, 
2007). Samuelson’s work was initially adopted by researchers as having both normative 
and descriptive validity. Despite Samuelson’s own significant reservations on the 
descriptive validity of his model (Frederick et al., 2002), the simplicity and intuitive 
nature of his DU model saw rapid adoption and utilization in the field of intertemporal 
choice. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE DISCOUNTED UTILITY MODEL 
More recently, researchers have acknowledged the limitations of the DU model, 
noting shortcomings with the primary assumption of the DU model, the concept that “all 
of the disparate motives underlying intertemporal choice can be condensed into a single 
parameter-the discount rate” (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 351), which requires individuals to 
display time consistent preferences. As the body of research has grown, it has become 
apparent that the DU model lacks descriptive validity. Thaler explains that theoretically 
in capital markets individuals and firms should behave “the same way at the margin since 
firms and individuals borrow or lend until their marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption today and consumption tomorrow is equal to the interest rate” (1981, p. 
201). However, observations of individuals acting on their own behalf have shown the 
above assumption of the DU model to be invalid (Goldin, 2007; Thaler, 1981). 
Individuals commonly borrow from tomorrow at rates far exceeding the interest rate. One 
need only look at the fees payday loan centers and credit card companies are able to 
charge in juxtaposition to the prevailing interest rate to view this phenomenon and realize 
that individuals are willing to increase their current consumption at the expense of their 
tx
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future. For example, Bankrate.com shows this disparity noting 14.02 percent interest 
rates on credit cards for November 2012, while certificate of deposit (CD) rates during 
the same period yielded 0.3 percent on a one year CD.               
In the DU model, an individual set to receive $100 today with a 10 percent 
discount rate, would be equally happy to receive $105 in six months or $110 in one year. 
Thaler (1981) tests the assumption of linear discounting behavior through an experiment 
that asks participants to choose between receiving (x) dollars now or y = (x + some 
additional amount) at a future date. In Thaler’s experiment, students were told that they 
had won a lottery payment, of varying amounts, that would be held in the bank. Students 
were given the option to take the money now or receive a greater amount of money at a 
later date. Thaler then asked the students what amount of extra money (y - x) would make 
them equally happy if they chose the option to wait and received the money at some time 
in the future. Thaler found that larger prizes and longer waiting periods induced dramatic 
decreases in the subjects’ implicit discount rates. One of Thaler’s most poignant 
observations was that interest rates and individual discount rates are commonly not equal. 
Coller and Williams also found a divergence between interest rates and individual 
discount rates, noting the “care must be taken when applying market rates as substitutes 
for individual discount rates” (1999, p. 123).  
C. OBSERVATIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF DISCOUNT RATES AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF BIAS 
Warner and Pleeter’s (2001) study of military downsizing in the early 1990s 
provides an excellent observation of personal discounting behavior in a large group of 
individuals faced with financial decisions involving large sums of money. Warner and 
Pleeter analyzed over 65,000 service members facing a choice to receive severance 
compensation as a lump-sum or as an annuity, and found that an overwhelming majority 
elected the lump-sum option, despite a greater than 17 percent discount rate to break even 
on the transaction when choosing the lump-sum. This situation was rare, given the large 




related research relying on small groups of individuals whose behaviors are measured 
through scientific experiments and/or surveys. The individual service members’ choices 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Selected Examples of Break Even Discount Rates (From Warner & Pleeter, 
2001) 
 
Along with generally high discount rates, Warner and Pleeter (2001) found 
significant correlation between individual discount rates and education, age, race, sex, 
number of dependents, ability test scores, size of payments, and if the individual was an 
officer or enlisted. Amongst officers, roughly 50 percent elected to take the lump-sum 
option compared to a 90 percent election rate amongst enlisted personnel. Surprisingly, 
DoD economists had initially projected a near zero percent lump-sum take rate for 
officers and only a 50 percent take rate for enlisted, basing those projections on 
conventional interest rates1 and the difference in total present value between the lump-
sum and the annuity payments (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). Warner and Pleeter’s finding of 
a significant divergence between interest rates and individual discount rates lends 
credibility to Thaler’s (1981) earlier findings.    
                                                 
1 Warner and Pleeter note that DoD planners used a seven percent interest rate, which was the current 
return during that period for money market holdings. 
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Warner and Pleeter (2001) found discount rates ranging from zero to 30 percent, 
with averages of 10.4 and 35.4 percent for officers and enlisted, respectively, which were 
generally higher than expected when compared with prior research. Cylke, Goldberg, 
Hogan, and Mairs found discount rates of 15 to 18 percent when reviewing Navy 
reenlistment bonuses (1982, p. 14), and Black (1984) utilized survey questions to 
estimate average discount rates of 10.3 and 12.5 percent for officers and enlisted 
personnel, respectively. More recent experimental research by Andreoni and Sprenger 
found aggregate discount rates of 30 percent when college students were studied in a 
CTB experiment (2012, p. 18).    
Warner and Pleeter (2001) argue that their research provides the more compelling 
measurement of discount rates based on two factors. First, the military downsizing 
program was not hypothetical, but real and involved large sums of money. For officers, 
the average difference in funds to be received between selecting the lump-sum payment 
or annuity payments was around $50,000 (Warner & Pleeter, p. 33). For enlisted 
personnel, this difference averaged $25,000 (Warner & Pleeter, p. 33). Secondly, most 
studies have targeted very homogeneous groups of people, such as college students or 
low-income populations. Military downsizing, in contrast, represented a diverse group of 
individuals ranging significantly in age, race, education, work experience, and income. 
Additionally, although not specifically highlighted by Warner and Pleeter, the military 
personnel studied represent individuals from all 50 states and with diverse geographic 
stationing.    
The high discount rates measured by Warner and Pleeter (2001) are not beyond 
criticism. It’s arguable that the military downsizing in the 1990s, stemming from the fall 
of the USSR, was largely unexpected and caught many service members by surprise. 
Prior to the drawdown, military members had enjoyed significant job security. It is likely 
that the unexpected nature of the drawdown announcement left many service members 
both startled and financially unprepared to transition to civilian employment. Warner and 
Pleeter, albeit unintentionally, provide some support to criticism of the high discount 
rates they present. Specifically, they find that income levels and discount rates are 
inversely related, thus it could be reasoned that a sudden perceived loss of future income 
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(being unexpectedly asked to resign from the military) could increase discount rates in 
affected individuals. This inverse relationship between income and discount rates is 
substantiated, a priori, by both Gilman (1976) and Black (1984).  
D. NOTABLE OBSERVATIONS OF HUMAN BIAS IN DISCOUNT RATES 
In their literature review, Warner and Pleeter (2001) nicely summarize three 
general findings from the field of time preference research, spanning from the mid-1970s 
through 2001. Firstly, individuals do not use a common discount rate for all future 
benefits, nor do they retain the same discount rate towards the same benefits at different 
points in time (Thaeler, 1981). Stationary instantaneous utility is a faulty assumption that 
contradicts these findings, but it is commonly used for analytical convenience, despite the 
general consensus that it is invalid (Frederick et al., 2002). A violation of stationary 
instantaneous utility could be as simple as considering the value of a cup of hot 
chocolate. An individual likely has a different value for the same cup of hot chocolate 
during the winter than during the summer.   
Magnitude effect is another bias in which individuals do not use a common 
discount rate for all future benefits. An example of magnitude effect would be an 
individual who is set to receive $10 next week but will likely take $9 today. However, if 
that same individual is owed $1,000,000 next week, it is unlikely he or she would opt to 
receive $900,000 today, even though both decisions carry the same discount rate. 
Research has consistently supported the idea of magnitude effects; as the value of 
benefits rise, individual discount rates tend to decline (Frederick et al., 2002).   
The second general finding is that discount rates vary with how near or distant the 
future benefit will be received. This is the concept of hyperbolic discounting, which is 
described by Frederick et al., (2002) as the best documented DU anomaly. Benefits to be 
received in the near future are commonly discounted at higher rates than benefits to be 
received in the distant future.   
Again consider an example where an individual is due to receive $1,000,000 in 
one month, but can instead choose to receive $990,000 in just one week. For many 
people, the one week option appears to be a great deal that puts them into retirement and 
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on an airplane to a Hawaiian vacation in less than seven days. An alternative situation 
promises the same individual $1,000,000 in 20 years or the option to receive $990,000 in 
19 years, eleven months and a week, just three weeks shy of 20 years. Again, the discount 
rates and waiting period between payoffs are exactly the same in both examples. Taking 
the money early in the first options seems more enticing than in the second option, 
supporting a pattern declining discount rates as the time to receive benefits increases. 
This has been confirmed in numerous studies (Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Thaler, 1981; Warner & Pleeter, 2001).  
Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) surprisingly find no signs of hyperbolic 
discounting in their CTB experiment, largely in disagreement with the body of research 
on time preferences. They note Halevy’s (2008) finding that present bias may be an 
artifact of individual assessments regarding the risk of receiving payments (Andreoni and 
Sprenger). Based on their experimental design, which places significant emphasis on 
reducing differential risk across the horizon of payments, Andreoni and Sprenger appear 
to eliminate signs of hyperbolic discounting and, at the very least, demonstrate the 
significant role that risk plays on time preferences.          
Warner and Pleeter’s (2001) third general finding is that discount rates vary 
significantly based on personal characteristics. Characteristics such as income, age, level 
of education, and race are highly correlated to discount rates. Warner and Pleeter found 
lower discount rates associated with higher levels of education, higher levels of income, 
and fewer dependents. In the case of education, discount rates in officer without a college 
education were found to be 7.5 percent higher than officer who held a college degree 
(Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 46). They also found correlations between race and 
individual discount rates, and that officers displayed lower discount rates compared to 
enlisted personnel (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). Coller and Williams (1999) found a 
correlation between discount rates and gender and, like Warner and Pleeter, also noted 
correlation with race. Surprisingly, Coller and Williams found a positive correlation 
between discount rates and wages; however, they noted this finding to be contrary to the 
prior research of Hausman (1979) and Lawrance (1991) and attributed their contradictory 
findings to their subject population of college students. Although unable to find an exact 
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causation, they believe it is possible “that a positive relationship between income and 
discount rates is an artifact of irregular income flows and expectations of future income 
increases that are unique to student subjects” (Coller & Williams, 1999, p. 123). 
Perhaps the most significant insight into the theory of time preference and the 
associated body of research is provided by Frederick et al., in their exhaustive and critical 
review of past research. Despite numerous studies focused on determining IDRs, little 
consensus has been achieved by researchers. Frederick et al., (2002) propose that the 
variance in research results might not reflect experimental failures, but rather demonstrate 
that discount rates are choice specific. They use this line of reasoning to recommend that 
new models on intertemporal choice should incorporate more behavioral factors, thus 
creating more descriptively accurate models. In summary, across the body of research on 
intertemporal choice, there is significant variance in the discount rates that researchers 
have found, as evidenced in Table 2. Somewhat problematic for military retirement 
researchers is that much of this research deals with small sums of money and generally 
short periods of time. With application to military retirement reform, the most notable 
findings are likely that discount rates vary significantly across different intertemporal 
choices, based on numerous factors such as value of the benefit or time of receipt. 
Secondly, discount rates have strong correlations to demographic factors, providing a 
possibility that certain military communities or demographics might respond significantly 
different than the general population 
 17
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: CTB AND MPL 
METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Considering the significant variability in discount rates across numerous well 
designed studies, we employ two separate experimental approaches to eliciting discount 
rates in service members. Those approaches are multiple price list (MPL) and convex 
time budget (CTB). MPL methodology stems from research initially conducted by Thaler 
(1981) that was designed partly in response to observations of unexplained time 
inconsistent behavior. Since Thaler, MPL has been used in several studies, most notably 
in the large-scale study of Denmark by Harrison et al. (2002). CTB is a newer adaptation 
of the MPL methodology, which addresses the discontinuity of budgets inherent in the 
MPL design (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2010).     
Risk and transaction costs are two major issues associated with discount rates 
elicited in field experiments (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2010) and are thought to be partly 
responsible for creating hyperbolic discounting (Halevy, 2008). The subjects’ risk of 
receiving payment and the transaction cost to the subject to claim payment are constant 
across both methodologies we employ, providing a rare opportunity to evaluate the 
outcomes of these different methodologies with equal exposure to the above biases.  
Experimental design for all subjects consists of scripted instructions, MPL, CTB, 
or combination treatment, subject estimates of prevailing interest rates, and a survey of 
demographic and economics related questions. By asking subjects to provide estimates of 
current interest rates associated with credit cards, savings accounts, and home mortgages, 
we can analyze elicited discount rates against current market estimates and provide some 
idea of subjects financial literacy. Whereas Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) limit their 
study to short-term discounting behavior, this experiment seeks to gather on data on both 
short-term and long-term discounting behavior that could be valuable for analyzing 
military retirement reform options. Additionally, due to the past research of Warner and 
Pleeter (2001), we will be able to compare actual observed discounting  
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behavior with experimentally elicited behavior. A copy of instructions, experiment 
questions, interest rate questions, and demographic questions are provided in the 
appendix. 
B. DEFINITIONS AND PARAMETERS 
The experimental methods we utilize vary the time period in which payments are 
received, amount of payment subjects receive, and the growth rate of payments from 
earlier to later periods. Time periods are represented by time of initial payment t, and 
time between initial payment and later payment are represented by k. Thus, receipt of an 
early payment comes at time t and receipt of a late payment would come at t+k. Payment 
amounts are represented by initial payments of n which are then increased by x to provide 
later payments that have a value of n + x. Interest rates of r control the rate of growth of 
payments from n to n+x, such that n * (1+r) = n+x.     
The application of payment amount boundaries and time periods is graphically 
displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Experiment Design Matrix 
 MPL CTB 
SHORT RUN Payments (n to n+x): $20–$30 
Time periods(t to t+k): 0–133 
days  
Interest rates (r): 0–1300% 
Payments (n to n+x): $20–$30 
Time periods(t to t+k): 0–133 
days  
Interest rates (r): 0–1300% 
LONG RUN Payments (n to n+x): $67k–
$340k  
Time periods(t to t+k): 1–49 
months 
Interest rates (r): 0–50% 
Payments (n to n+x): $67k–$340k 
Time periods(t to t+k):  1–49 
months 
Interest rates (r): 0–50% 
C. MULTIPLE PRICE LIST TREATMENT 
For the MPL experimental method, subjects would be asked to make choices 
between receiving an amount of money at some near time or receiving a larger amount 
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money at some later time. The basic format asks subjects if they would prefer $20 now or 
$20 + x at some later time. Each question contains a list of 20 options in which x begins 
at zero and gradually increases. As x increases, we expect individuals will begin to shift 
their preferences from the early payment to the later payment. The point at which an 
individual switches from near period consumption to the later period consumption 
provides an estimate of their discount rate. For example, if an individual prefers $20 near 
term over $25 one period later, but then switches on the next option and rejects $20 near 
term for $26 at the later period, we can conclude that their IDR falls between 25–30 
percent. 
In our experiment design, we would present this basic question to subjects in a 
series of six varied questions. The first four questions provide the option to receive early 
payment in one month, t =1. We then vary the later payment periods t + k at 7, 13, 25, 
and 49 months respectively. Time periods are selected to provide for two observations of 
subjects preferences for payments roughly within a one year time span, the time period in 
which hyperbolic discounting is most commonly observed (Frederick et al., 2002), and 
also provide observations of preferences at longer intervals. For the final two questions, 
we provide the option to receive the early payment in five years and 10 years, 
respectively. We then vary the later payment periods at five years and six months and 
also at 10 years and six months. Although our design will present subjects with three 
questions that have a six month waiting period, the time from present until initial 
payment varies significantly. This design should allow us to observe time inconsistent 
behavior, should it be present.  
For the above design, we use two payment schemes. The first scheme uses 
relatively small dollar amounts where the initial payment has a value of $20 and later 
payments have values up to $30. These amounts are specifically selected for their close 
approximation to the dollar amounts used by Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) in their CTB 
experiment, which we replicate. Our second price scheme uses much larger numbers, 
where the initial payment has a value of $67,000 and later payments expand up to 
$340,000, the estimated NPV of military retirement for an enlisted service member as 
projected by Grefer et al (2012). We alter the dollar amounts between relatively 
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insignificant sums to relatively large sums in these two treatments to test for consistency 
in intertemporal preferences as the value of a benefit changes.  
An additional variation is the payment description. For the six questions, 
individuals are told that they have been “selected to receive a cash payment.”  We 
randomly alter this description amongst subjects and instead notify them that they have 
been “selected to receive a retirement payment.”  We are not familiar with any studies 
that have viewed this type of alternative wording; however, we are interested to observe 
if the word “retirement” induces individuals to alter their discounting behavior.          
D. CONVEX TIME BUDGET TREATMENT 
Our CTB experiment is a replication of Andreoni and Sprenger (2010). This 
experimental setup provides individuals with 100 tokens. Individuals are asked to allocate 
those 100 tokens between a near term payment option, where each token has a value of at 
and a long-term payment option where each token has a value of a(t +k). For example, near 
term tokens have a value of $0.10 and long term tokens have a value of $0.12. An 
individual who splits 100 tokens evenly between the two options would receive $5 in the 
near term and $6 at a later term. 
In accordance with Andreoni and Sprenger (2010), we present subjects with 45 
convex budget decisions. The 45 different decisions presented result from variations in 
time for the initial payment (t), delay period (k), and interest rates applied to payments. 
Also in accordance with Andreoni and Sprenger (2010), we utilize the following 
parameters; near term payment dates of t = (0, 7, 35) and long term payment dates of k = 
(35, 70, 98). Interest rates are set to vary from 0 to over 1000 percent per year.  
As with the MPL experiment, we use two payment schemes. The first duplicates 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) in which payments range from $20–$30. The second 
scheme presents subjects with choices that range from $67,000 to $340,000.    
Because of the coin allocation mechanism in the CTB design, we are able to 
overcome higher than expected discount rate biases associated with the assumption of 
linear utility present in the MPL design. If utility is actually concave, a model such as 
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MPL that assumes linear utility will bias discount rates upwards (Andreoni & Sprenger, 
2010). Additionally, the CTB methodology provides subjects with more choices and 
customizations. This approach agrees with Frederick et al., who in their thorough review 
of intertemporal choice studies provide a final view that “intertemporal choices reflect 
many distinct considerations and often involve the interplay of several competing 
motives” (2002, p. 394).  
E. COMPENSATION OF SUBJECTS 
In these experiments, we link individual responses to compensation to ensure that 
subjects’ choices most accurately reflect their preferences. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, subjects are provided with verbal instructions which include a clear 
explanation of the monetary payments.   
We inform subjects that they will receive compensation based on their answers to 
the experimental questions. One question will be selected at random in each subject 
group, and individuals will receive compensation based on their answer, or preferences 
displayed, to that question. Secondly, we explain to subjects that some questions deal 
with relatively small sums of money and other questions deal with relatively large sums 
of money. If a question dealing with a relatively small sum of money (under $20) is 
selected, subjects will receive payments that align exactly with their responses. If a 
question that deals with relatively large sums of money is selected, subjects will receive 
payments based on their selections that have been scaled down to a maximum payment of 
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V. REVIEW OF THE CNA ANALYSIS 
In their analysis of military retirement reform, Grefer et al., (2012) review five 
potential options for military retirement reform. Additionally, they estimate a 20 percent 
reduction in military benefits, based on the Military Reform Act of 1986, and then spread 
those benefits across different time periods in order to develop the five options with 
different NPVs (Grefer et al.). For their analysis, officers are assigned discount rates 
ranging from 7.0–10.5 percent, while enlisted personnel are assigned discount rates 
ranging from 8.7–12.5 percent. These discount rates represent a service member with 10 
YOS and are based on Grefer et al., (2012) literature review. Discount rates are kept 
static, and are then applied to benefits that span significantly different periods of time to 
calculate the change in career compensation. 
Table 4.   CNA Sample Discount Rates (From Grefer et al., 2012) 
 
There are five elements to the total compensation package. The defined benefits 
(DB2) and defined contribution (DC) portions of retirement are not available to service 
members until they reach the age of 62 and 60 respectively. The defined benefit (DB1) 
and continuation pay (CP) are not available until retirement at 20 YOS, while the 
transition pay (TP) becomes available earlier (12 YOS for enlisted personnel and16 YOS 
for officers).       
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Table 5.   CNA Sample Retirement Structure (From Grefer et al., 2012) 
 
Each of these five benefits would become available to service members during 
significantly different time periods and represent significantly different types of 
compensation ranging from annuities to lump sum payments. Despite these variances, 
static discount rates are utilized across all of these potential benefits, ignoring the notion 
of time inconsistency in IDRs that has been captured by the body of intertemporal choice 
research (Frederick et al., 2002). 
Research has shown higher IDR’s for benefits to be received earlier and lower 
discount rates for benefits in more distant periods. The impact of varied discount rates, 
which comply with the observed behavior of time inconsistency, could significantly alter 
the projected NPVs of reformed benefits. It is possible that alternative NPVs could be 
higher for some scenarios; however, it is most likely that NPVs will be lower due to the 
impact of increased discount rates for earlier benefits reducing the value of those benefits. 
This potential reduction in NPVs could result in preferences amongst service members 
that differ from analysts’ expectations.   
Utilizing a NPV model created by Chu (2012), we are able to easily adjust 
discount rates amongst the five different types of compensation CNA models. We 
compare application of a static discount rate in officers of seven percent, as CNA does in 
its analyses (Grefer et al., 2012), with application of time inconsistent discount rates of 
seven percent applied to DB1, DB2, and DC and a marginally higher rate of 9.0 percent 
for CP and TP. This two percent increase is chosen to display potential changes in NPV 
due to a relatively small shift in discount rates. We then duplicate this process and 
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increase discount rates in the earlier payments by 10 percent to show the potential change 
in NPV with greater variance in IDRs. These variations provide discount rates that fall 
well within the range of discount rates measured in past research (Frederick et al., 2002). 
We then replicate this process for officers utilizing a static discount rate of 11 percent and 
for enlisted personnel with static discount rates of 8.7 and 12.5 percent in alignment with 
CNAs model.     
Results of the modeling described above are shown in Tables 6 and 7. With 
application of discount rates that vary two percent between (TP, CP) and (DB1, DB2 and 
DC) we see a decrease in officer NPV ranging from 0.5 percent up to two percent across 
the five DoD options when compared to the NPV measured when discount rates are held 
constant at seven percent. When we apply this same treatment but with fixed discount 
rates set at 11 percent and again a two percent variation between (CP,TP) and (DB1, 
DB2, and DC) we find a decrease in NPV ranging from 0.7–2.7 percent. With higher 
variation in the IDR between (CP, TP) and (DB1, DB2, and DC) set to 10 percent, we see 
reductions in officer NPV of benefits ranging from 2.7 percent to 10.1 percent when 
compared to a static discount rate of seven percent; and decreases in NPV ranging from 
3.9 percent to 13.2 percent when compared to a static discount rate of 11 percent. Results 
in enlisted personnel are similar, with discounts in NPV ranging from 0.7 percent up to 
17.2 percent across all the options.    
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Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 139,958.34$  89,573.34$     223,933.34$  167,950.01$  195,941.67$  8.7%
DB2 41,437.41$     33,149.93$     33,149.93$     24,862.45$     29,006.19$     8.7%
DC 45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     8.7%
CP 19,298.99$     19,919.04$     19,919.04$     51,541.48$     35,885.27$     10.7%
TP 143,001.00$  171,601.20$  28,600.20$     57,200.40$     42,900.30$     10.7%
NPV with variable d 8.7% and 10.7% 389,572.66$  360,120.43$  351,479.43$  347,431.26$  349,610.36$ 
NPV with fixed d of 8.7% 386,953.44$  357,417.05$  348,776.06$  340,436.14$  344,740.07$ 
Differnce in value  (2,619.22)$     (2,703.38)$     (2,703.38)$     (6,995.11)$     (4,870.28)$    
% difference 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 2.0% 1.4%
Enlisted CNA Scenario 2 Discount Rate of 12.5% with 2% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 106,982.63$  68,468.88$     171,172.21$  128,379.16$  149,775.68$  12.5%
DB2 15,315.58$     12,252.46$     12,252.46$     9,189.35$       10,720.91$     12.5%
DC 21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     12.5%
CP 25,281.19$     26,093.44$     26,093.44$     67,518.04$     47,008.80$     14.5%
TP 143,001.00$  171,601.20$  28,600.20$     57,200.40$     42,900.30$     14.5%
NPV with variable d 12.5% and 14.5% 312,122.54$  299,958.12$  259,660.45$  283,829.08$  271,947.82$ 
NPV with fixed d of 12.5% 308,798.39$  296,527.17$  256,229.50$  274,951.33$  265,766.77$ 
NPV difference in value  (3,324.15)$     (3,430.95)$     (3,430.95)$     (8,877.75)$     (6,181.05)$    
NPV% difference 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 3.1% 2.3%
Enlisted CNA Scenario 1 Discount Rate of 8.7% with 10% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 139,958.34$  89,573.34$     223,933.34$  167,950.01$  195,941.67$  8.7%
DB2 41,437.41$     33,149.93$     33,149.93$     24,862.45$     29,006.19$     8.7%
DC 45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     45,876.92$     8.7%
CP 33,725.57$     34,809.13$     34,809.13$     90,070.31$     62,710.61$     18.7%
TP 143,001.00$  171,601.20$  28,600.20$     57,200.40$     42,900.30$     18.7%
NPV with variable d 8.7% and 18.7% 403,999.25$  375,010.52$  366,369.52$  385,960.09$  376,435.69$ 
NPV with fixed d of 8.7% 386,953.44$  357,417.05$  348,776.06$  340,436.14$  344,740.07$ 
NPV difference in value  (17,045.81)$   (17,593.46)$   (17,593.46)$   (45,523.95)$   (31,695.62)$  
NPV% difference 4.2% 4.7% 4.8% 11.8% 8.4%
Enlisted CNA Scenario 2 Discount Rate of 12.5% with 10% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 106,982.63$  68,468.88$     171,172.21$  128,379.16$  149,775.68$  12.5%
DB2 15,315.58$     12,252.46$     12,252.46$     9,189.35$       10,720.91$     12.5%
DC 21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     21,542.14$     12.5%
CP 43,395.26$     44,789.49$     44,789.49$     115,894.98$  80,690.79$     22.5%
TP 143,001.00$  171,601.20$  28,600.20$     57,200.40$     42,900.30$     22.5%
NPV with variable d 12.5% and 22.5% 330,236.61$  318,654.17$  278,356.50$  332,206.02$  305,629.81$ 
NPV with fixed d of 12.5% 308,798.39$  296,527.17$  256,229.50$  274,951.33$  265,766.77$ 
NPV difference in value  (21,438.22)$   (22,127.00)$   (22,127.00)$   (57,254.69)$   (39,863.04)$  
NPV% difference 6.5% 6.9% 7.9% 17.2% 13.0%
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Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 251,357.39$      160,868.73$      402,171.83$      301,628.87$      351,900.35$      7.0%
DB2 148,735.17$      118,988.13$      118,988.13$      89,241.10$         104,114.62$      7.0%
DC 125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      7.0%
CP 57,831.39$         113,361.54$      86,947.20$         235,427.81$      161,387.61$      9.0%
TP 245,979.00$      295,174.80$      49,195.80$         98,391.60$         73,793.70$         9.0%
NPV with variable d 7.0% and 9.0% 829,603.55$      814,093.80$      783,003.56$      850,389.97$      816,896.87$     
NPV with fixed d of 7.0% 825,474.44$      805,999.89$      776,795.61$      833,580.65$      805,373.95$     
NPV difference in value  (4,129.11)$         (8,093.91)$         (6,207.95)$         (16,809.32)$       (11,522.92)$      
NPV% difference 0.5% 1.0% 0.8% 2.0% 1.4%
Officer CNA Scenario 2 Discount Rate of 11.0% with 2% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 192,462.86$      123,176.23$      307,940.58$      230,955.43$      269,448.00$      11.0%
DB2 58,825.19$         47,060.15$         47,060.15$         35,295.11$         41,177.63$         11.0%
DC 68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         11.0%
CP 66,799.23$         130,940.36$      100,429.98$      271,935.27$      186,413.76$      13.0%
TP 245,979.00$      295,174.80$      49,195.80$         98,391.60$         73,793.70$         13.0%
NPV with variable d 11.0% and 13.0% 632,145.59$      664,430.85$      572,705.82$      704,656.72$      638,912.41$     
NPV with fixed d of 11.0% 627,540.51$      655,403.95$      565,782.28$      685,909.78$      626,061.23$     
NPV difference in value  (4,605.07)$         (9,026.90)$         (6,923.54)$         (18,746.94)$       (12,851.18)$      
NPV% difference 0.7% 1.4% 1.2% 2.7% 2.0%
Officer CNA Scenario 1 Discount Rate of 7.0% with 10% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 251,357.39$      160,868.73$      402,171.83$      301,628.87$      351,900.35$      7.0%
DB2 148,735.17$      118,988.13$      118,988.13$      89,241.10$         104,114.62$      7.0%
DC 125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      125,700.60$      7.0%
CP 76,771.69$         150,488.46$      115,423.19$      312,532.52$      214,243.50$      17.0%
TP 245,979.00$      295,174.80$      49,195.80$         98,391.60$         73,793.70$         17.0%
NPV with variable d 7.0% and 17.0% 848,543.85$      851,220.72$      811,479.54$      927,494.68$      869,752.76$     
NPV with fixed d of 7.0% 825,474.44$      805,999.89$      776,795.61$      833,580.65$      805,373.95$     
NPV difference in value  (23,069.41)$       (45,220.83)$       (34,683.93)$       (93,914.04)$       (64,378.81)$      
NPV% difference 2.7% 5.3% 4.3% 10.1% 7.4%
Officer CNA Scenario 2 Discount Rate of 11.0% with 10% Variation
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 Discount Rates
DB1 192,462.86$      123,176.23$      307,940.58$      230,955.43$      269,448.00$      11.0%
DB2 58,825.19$         47,060.15$         47,060.15$         35,295.11$         41,177.63$         11.0%
DC 68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         68,079.31$         11.0%
CP 87,821.16$         172,147.70$      132,035.62$      357,514.16$      245,078.77$      21.0%
TP 245,979.00$      295,174.80$      49,195.80$         98,391.60$         73,793.70$         21.0%
NPV with variable d 11.0% and 21.0% 653,167.51$      705,638.19$      604,311.45$      790,235.61$      697,577.41$     
NPV with fixed d of 11.0% 627,540.51$      655,403.95$      565,782.28$      685,909.78$      626,061.23$     
NPV difference in value  (25,627.00)$       (50,234.24)$       (38,529.17)$       (104,325.83)$     (71,516.18)$      
NPV% difference 3.9% 7.1% 6.4% 13.2% 10.3%
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Significant variances in IDRs have been measured across a wide body of research, 
utilizing numerous different techniques ranging from observing actual transactions to 
purposing designed experiments. IDRs play a significant role in models used to calculate 
NPVs; thus it is import for policymakers and analysts to have access to the most accurate 
and appropriate IDRs. Warner and Pleeter (2001) show that a miscalculation of discount 
rates by DoD during the military drawdown of the early 1990s resulted in savings of 
greater than 1.7 billion dollars in separation payments. In this instance, DoD found itself 
on the positive side of error; however, it is possible that a similar error could instead cost 
DoD significantly. Such costs would not likely be direct but would instead be incurred 
through significant retention or recruiting changes.      
The majority of research shows evidence of relatively high IDRs (Frederick et al., 
2002), which aligns with proposals to reform military retirement by reducing the value of 
certain benefits and moving those benefits forward in time. Despite the rational belief that 
individuals will discount near prevailing interest rates, research has consistently shown 
otherwise (Frederick et al., 2002). The success of both credit card companies and payday 
loan stores, commonly located outside the main gates of military installations, provide 
clear evidence of individuals displaying high IDRs. However, convincing, we must make 
every effort to study these observations with sufficient attention towards known biases. 
An IDR preference for current disposable income likely will not have the same value as 
an IDR towards a longer-term retirement annuity.          
This vast body of research supports the alterations to military retirement 
compensation proposed by DoD and analyzed in the CNA study. However, a significant 
portion of this research utilizes the unidimensional DU methodology, which distills 
numerous intertemporal choices into a single number using a single time and value-
independent discount rate. As research on intertemporal choice has progressed, it is clear 
that IDRs are very situation specific (Frederick et al., 2001), making the results of past 
studies valuable but not necessarily suitable. An alternative would emphasize more 
focused research using time-dependent IDRs. 
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Changes to military retirement, should they be implemented, will undoubtedly 
have a significant impact on the behaviors of current and future service members. The 
CBO (2012a, p. 1) states that changes to the current retirement system “could cost less or 
more than the current system, depending on how they were structured and implemented, 
and savings might not be achieved for several years.”  Given the narrow margins for error 
that DoD must traverse regarding costs and unexpected changes in retention and 
recruiting, every effort should be made to mitigate potentially costly and dangerous risks 
inherent with an overly simplistic analysis of this retirement compensation reform. 
To ensure the most accurate retirement analysis is provided to policymakers, DoD 
and DON should conduct further research on service member discount rates, providing 
specific attention to time inconsistencies and demographic trends in discounting 
behavior. Grefer et al., (2012) find that changes to military retirement described in the 
CNA report will reduce retention and achieve savings largely from the resulting more 
junior force. Additionally, Grefer et al., (2012) estimate 51 years from when retirement 
reform is implemented until the retirement pension debt is paid down, if DoD 
grandfathers all current service members. Given these potentially significant shifts in the 
military manpower footprint for such modest changes in the military retirement system’s 
debt burden, care should be taken to fully evaluate the potential impacts of military 
retirement reform.   
 
33
APPENDIX A. INSTRUCTION TO PARTICIPANT 
Payment for your Participation 
You will receive a $10 participation payment for this experiment. You will 
receive this $10 participation payment in two $5 payments which will be provided at 
some earlier and later date. The dates of the payment will be based on your answers to a 
randomly selected question in the experiment.  
Additionally, in this experiment you will be asked to make choices about 
allocating money between two points in time, one time is earlier and one time is later. 
One of these questions will be randomly selected, and you will receive an additional 
payment in excess of the $10 participation payment based on your answer to the 
randomly selected question. Some questions deal with very large amounts of money and 
some questions deal with small amounts of money. In the case of questions with small 
amounts of money, you will receive payments that are equal to your allocations or 
selections. In the case of questions with large amounts of money, you will receive 
payments that are scaled down.    
Your Identity 
In order to receive payment, we will need to collect the following personal 
identity information from you: name, e-mail address, mailing address, and phone number. 
This information will only be seen by Professor Myung and his research assistant. After 
all payments have been sent, this information will be destroyed. Your identity will not be 
a part of subsequent data analysis.   
You have been assigned a participant number. This number will be linked to your 
personal information in order to provide you payment based on your responses. After all 
payments have been made, only the participant number will remain in the data set and as 
stated earlier, your personal information will be destroyed. 
The Study 
In this study you will be asked one of two types of questions about receiving 
money at either an earlier or later date. In one type of question you will be asked to select 
between receiving some dollar amount at an earlier date or receiving some alternative 
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larger dollar amount at a later date. In the second type of question you will be provided 
100 tokens and asked to allocate those tokens to an earlier or later date. Tokens allocated 
to the earlier date will have lower values than tokens allocated to the later date. For 
example a token received today might be worth 10 cents/token and a token received next 
week might be worth 12 cents/token.    
These two types of questions are best described by the following example 
questions. 
Sample MPL Question 
Imagine that you have been selected to receive a cash payment. You may either 
receive payment option A in one month or payment option B in seven months. Please 
select your preferred payment option (A or B) for the following payoff alternatives. 
PAYMENT OPTION A 
(Pays A in 4 weeks) 
PAYMENT OPTION B 
(Pays B in 6 weeks) 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 20.25 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 20.50 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 20.75 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 21.00 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 21.25 
Select Option (A) or (B) $20.00 22.50 
Select Option (A) or (B) Continued to 30 options Continued to 30 options 
Sample CTB Question 
Imagine that you have been selected to receive a cash payment in the form of 100 
tokens. You may allocate the tokens between two points in time, an “earlier payment” 
and “later payment.”  Tokens may have different value at the two different points in time.  
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